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In the wake of the Iranian revolution, Middle Eastern countries
are experiencing a resurgence of populist Islam. Described as
"fundamentalist", these movements appear to be serious threats to
the governments of these countries. In Tunisia, the government has
virtually halted its promised democratic reforms claiming that the
Islamists will use the political process to gain control of the
government and that they are violent radicals attempting to
overthrow the government.
This thesis argues that the Islamic movement in Tunisia is
neither revolutionary, radical, nor fundamentalist. Islam has played
an important role historically in the creation of Tunisian
nationalism and the current movement is a political movement
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I. INTRODUCTION
Following World War II, North Africa was viewed as critical to
the defense of Europe against a Soviet invasion. Direct U.S.
involvement in the region, however, was limited to Libya as Morocco,
Algeria and Tunisia were still French colonies. Following Tunisia's
independence in 1956, U.S. aid was limited as Tunisia was still
viewed as an exclusive French preserve. During the Kennedy
administration this position changed and, with a significant
increase in U.S. economic aid, Tunisia embarked on a modernization
program. Tunisia's President Habib Bourguiba, decidedly pro-
Western in his views, eschewed Nasser's pan-Arabism and rejected
Islam as a backward influence on his efforts to modernize Tunisia.
Described as a "friend" of the U.S., Tunisia was held up as a model of
modernization for other Arab and third world countries.
Tunisia took a back seat in U.S. policy during the 1970s as
events in the Middle East erupted, although it was still considered
relatively important (in part due to the loss of Wheeler Air Base in
Libya) to the U.S.'s Middle East policy and the defense of the
Mediterranean. Under Reagan's anti-communist and anti-Libya
policies, Tunisia's position in U.S. policy rose again. By the 1980s,
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U.S./Tunisian policy was essentially twofold: denying Soviet
influence or intervention in the Mediterranean area; and ensuring the
territorial integrity of Tunisia, particularly against Libya.
Although Tunisia was experiencing serious economic difficulties in
the 1980s, Reagan's emphasis on military build-up resulted in U.S.
military assistance soon surpassing economic assistance. Even so,
Tunisia played a minor role in Reagan's global strategy. As
Ambassador Richard Parker noted in the mid-1980s:
"An area of critical interest once in American
history. North Africa does not bear heavily on the
consciousness of the average American today. U.S. policy
makers are usually too preoccupied with the Middle East,
Europe, or Asia to devote sufficient time to it, and one
looks in vain for meaningful coverage of North African
events in the U.S. press." [Ref. 20, pg. ix]
The collapse of the Soviet Union, coupled with Tunisia's small
size and limited military capabilities have raised questions
concerning Tunisia's continuing importance to the U.S. Opinions
among analysts vary. Some hold that Tunisia no longer has strategic
importance to the U.S. while others claim it is critical in light of
U.S. /Libyan relations. These views are, unfortunately, based on
President Reagan's foreign policy paradigm that might makes right
and a nation's greatness is measured by its military strength.
Tunisia is both an African state and an Arab state. Much of the
world's oil comes from Africa and the Middle East, yet as the Gulf
War and current events demonstrate, these regions face ongoing
threats to their stability. Tunisia is influenced by and influences
other countries of the region. One of the greatest apparent threats
faced by the region today is Islamic "fundamentalism".
Since the Iranian revolution in 1979, the majority of
Westerners have associated Islamic movements with terrorism,
radicalism, and hostage taking. The term "fundamentalist" is used
broadly, and frequently inaccurately, to characterize these
movements. Accordingly, Islamists are viewed as representing a
society which is backward and whose intransigent religious beliefs
prevent them from ever accepting modernizing changes. Anti-
Western sentiments are perceived as irrational and evidence of a
conscious unwillingness to form productive ties with the West. This
view of Islam has its roots in the writings of European academics of
the nineteenth century who, in short, justified colonization as a
means of enlightening a backward, barbaric people. As one of the
most influential theorists of colonialism, Jules Harmand, wrote:
"We must therefore accept as our basic principle
the fact that a hierarchy of races and civilizations
exists, and that we belong to the highest race, the
highest civilization. But we must realize, too, that our
superiority imposes important duties on us, as well as
giving us certain rights. For we are superior not only in
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the economic and military, but especially in the moral,
sense. That fact constitutes our main justification for
the conquest of native peoples." [Ref. 74, pg. 4]
The reassertion of Islam as a new social and political ideology
bears four major characteristics:
1. it is a force of international appeal and is evident in
societies with widely varying economic and political systems;
2. it is a growing, powerful force within both the Shiite and
Sunni schools of Islam;
3. it is not a monolithic, formally organized, or centrally
controlled movement but rather a loose coalition of highly diffuse
groups that manifest themselves differently from country to country
and from time to time; and
4. it is primarily a populist movement as opposed to an
official or establishment phenomenon. [Ref. 36, pg. 130]
Tunisia's classification as a democracy by the West has been
largely based on the fact that Tunisia holds local and national
elections. However, until the early 1980s, the ruling party, the
Parti Socialiste Destourien (PSD), was the only legal party. In 1974,
Bourguiba had been elected president for the life of the party which,
coupled with Bourguiba's need for absolute control of the
government did not allow for the recognition of opposition parties.
Bourguiba's decision in April 1981 to finally include these parties in
elections was prompted by increasing criticism of the government
and an effort to stem the growing popularity of the Tunisian populist
Islamic movement which named itself the Islamic Tendency
Movement (MTI). The rules for recognition, however, made it
difficult for the opposition parties to participate and the
government immediately cracked down on the MTI, claiming the
movement was attempting to overthrow the government. Although
the U.S. continued to voice its support for Tunisia, concerns were
growing over the aging president's succession and increasing reports
of repression and human rights violations. Repression of the MTI
continued to increase until 1987 when Bourguiba was removed from
office by his Prime Minister Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, a brigadier
general and former head of Tunisia's secret police.
In two visits to the U.S., Ben Ali assured the U.S. of Tunisia's
continued support. In Tunisia, he embarked on a sweeping program of
political liberalization. This did much to alleviate U.S. concerns. By
mid-1989, however, as Ben Ali was implementing essential
economic reforms, his popularity was waning. Political dissension
had not been curbed and he appeared increasingly autocratic.
Repressive measures were reinstituted against the MTI and other
critics of the government and the political climate of Tunisia has
become as oppressive as it was in the later years of Bourguiba's
presidency. The primary goal of the government of Tunisia
continues to be the elimination of the Islamic "threat".
This thesis will argue that, contrary to commonly held views,
the Islamic movement in Tunisia is not a movement attempting to
replace Tunisia's secularist government with a fundamentalist
ideology. Instead, Islam has historically played an instrumental role
in the creation of Tunisian nationalism and serves as a political
vehicle for challenging corrupt and unresponsive governments.
II. THE ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE
A. THE APPEAL OF ISLAM
The underlying appeal of a recourse to Islam as the basis of
dissent is fourfold. First, Islam is venerated as the focus of Middle
East identity and the source of the socio-political framework passed
down from earlier generations. Secondly, while modern liberal
nation-building commenced with the depoliticization of Islam, the
great periods of Islamic history were those in which the caliph was
the real ruler and the empire was an Islamic political state.
Militancy thus acquired the stature of a problem-solving doctrine,
given the failures of the secular elites. The third reason relates to
the Prophet's particular dislike of idolatry— his rejection of false
gods and values. The image of Islam as a purifying religion has
popular appeal today because to many people the Middle East and
North Africa seem "polluted" by Western secular culture. This
culture is identified as anti-religious and anti-social in the sense
that it rejects all the moral principles upon which the unified
Islamic community was traditionally based. Finally, the use of
Islam as the framework of dissent seems to offer a way of over-
coming the paralyzing split between the Westernized culture of the
elite and the popular culture of the masses. [ 73, pp. 127-8]
B. SIX MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS OF ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS
Although there are hundreds of different Populist Islamic
groups and organizations, all share the following six major
characteristics:
1. All believe in the centrality of the Prophet Muhammad, the
Quran, and the Sunna (the body of Islamic customs and practices
based on the Prophet's words and deeds);
2. All stress the principles of equality and social justice;
3. All oppose corrupt and repressive government;
4. All condemn external, imperial intervention in the affairs
of their societies;
5. All demonstrate a complete dedication to their principles
and are often willing to make the ultimate sacrifice for them, and;
6. All believe that the only ideological system that will
enable them to achieve these goals is the Islamic system. [Ref. 36,
pg. 131]
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C. THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
The Western held theory of "Oriental despotism" espouses the
ideas that Muslim societies are lead by patrimonial leaders and
bureaucracies whose absolute domination of the state is prevented
by the segmentation of society into smaller self-contained units
(tribes, clans, etc.). In such a setting, revolts are infrequent and of
little importance. Additionally, it is understood that rebellion is
not sanctioned within Islamic tradition. [Ref. 4, pg. 334]
On the contrary, an Islamic state is not an absolute or
sovereign entity. It is subject to the higher norms of the shariah
(Islamic law) that represent the will of God. Politically this rules
out all forms of absolutism. Legally it paves the way for the
development of constitutional law, a set of norms limiting state
powers. In fact, the Islamic tradition of rules limiting the power of
the sovereign is much older than the concept of constitutional law in
the secular West. [Ref. 3, pg. 246]
Examples of the obligations of the ruler to the people as
dictated by the shariah include the prohibition on usury, the
assurance of the supply of grain to the market at reasonable prices
and the insistence that only Quranically sanctioned taxes be
imposed. When economic justice is flagrantly violated, Muslims
have invoked their religiously sanctioned right to rebel. Such a
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rebellion occurred in Tunisia in 1864 (discussed in Part III) and was
analogous to the Western European Christian notion of a moral
economy and the eighteenth-century English riots. [Ref. 4, pg. 335]
The fact that Muslim governments often responded to the
demands of such rebellions challenges the view of despotic leaders
and submissive masses. Further, those leaders who did not respond
were regarded as illegitimate.
D. THE ECONOMY
It is the concept of a moral economy which prompts many
Muslims to reject both the Western model of individual capitalism
and the Socialist model of state capitalism. The priorities of
capitalism which are materialistic, are basically different from
those of Islam. and have aspects which permit wholesale
exploitation. Economic activities, according to Islamic thought,
must be conducted for the good of all and it is the duty of every man
and woman to participate in economically productive activity. The
shariah provides guidance on savings and the investment of surplus
earnings into the process of production in the form of capital to
further social productivity. [Ref. 13, pp. 271-2]
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E. FUNDAMENTALISM
Fundamentalism, by definition, was a phenomenon occurring in
certain periods of Western Christian history which tried to impose a
literalist interpretation of the Bible. The fundamentalist groups in
Christian history came up with many new interpretations and
strange religio-political positions and are generally regarded as
reactionary and unrealistic. In contrast, the Islamic resurgence is
a future-oriented movement. [Ref. 1, pp. 225-6] Islamism is not, for
the most part, a blanket rejection of modernization. It is an
attempt to create a social moralism to replace the traditional moral
system which has been destroyed by modernization.
The term fundamentalism is used by non-Muslims to refer to
the system of taqlid. From its beginnings, the practice of Islam
included the process of deducing laws and regulations from the
original texts of the Quran and Sunna— a process which involved a
high degree of reasoning and interpretation—known as ijtihad.
Toward the end of the eleventh century, many sections of the Muslim
community, especially jurists, became more and more anxious about
the ever present tendency of despotic rulers to manipulate ijtihad
for their own purposes. They were also anxious about the corrosive
effects of foreign concepts and ideas which ijtihad inevitably drew
into Muslim thought. Those anxieties caused the emergence of the
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taqlid (to follow or imitate) which discouraged ijtihad and required
succeeding generations of jurists and lawyers to recognize the
authority of the deductions, interpretations and reasonings of the
first generations of jurists as final. Over time, taqlid in the Sunni
community reigned supreme and jurists and lawyers were no longer
allowed any initiative. [Ref. 2, pp. 234-5] It is through the revival
of the practice of ijtihad that the Islamists hope to bring Islam and
Islamic societies into congruence with the modern world.
In another way, fundamentalism is used to describe a belief
system in which the social and the political are inseparable. When
fundamentalism is state-sponsored, it focuses mainly on the social
aspects and is used as a way of preserving the political status quo.
In the cases of Saudi Arabia and Iran, this includes social pressures
such as forcing women to wear veils and making men go to mosques.
The purpose is to invade the private sphere of the citizens and keep
them from questioning the government's legitimacy. While some
fundamentalists are extremely political, their agenda habitually
confuses political and social issues. That is, they want the
political power to force their social norms on everyone. [Ref. 25]
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III. TUNISIAN REFORMS IN THE MODERN ERA
A. EARLY REFORMS 1759-1814
Although a part of the Ottoman empire since the sixteenth
century, the sultan's authority over Tunisia and the other Barbary
states of North Africa, was never very imposing. In the eighteenth
century, North African Corsairs recognized the sultan's overlordship
only to the extent of sending him an annual token gift. [Ref. 5, pg.
246] The image of North Africa engraved in most European history
books is that of the Barbary pirates and the sin, wickedness, and
vice in the Maghrebi port cities, but do not mention European
privateering activities against North African vessels. Similarly,
European history books make no mention of the flourishing
commercial relations that existed between North Africa and Europe
in the eighteenth century. The U.S. holds a similar perception. [Ref.
33, pg. 13]
In the late eighteenth century, the Tunisian economy went into
decline. From 1784 to 1860 there were repeated crop failures and
outbreaks of plague. At the same time, Europeans turned the terms
of trade in the Mediterranean to the disadvantage of Tunisia. The
industrial revolution and the tremendous increase of European
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production undermined Tunisian industries. By the middle decades of
the nineteenth century the most highly capitalized and profitable
Tunisian industry was in decline. At the same time the price of
olive oil declined drastically, and Tunisia was left importing
manufactured and luxury products in an unfavorable balance-of
payments situation. [Ref. 6, pg. 396]
During their combined reigns from 1759 to 1814, both 'Ali II
and Hammuda Bey took a direct interest in developing agriculture
and correcting government abuses which had hampered its growth.
'Ali abolished the mushtara system in which the state bought crops
from peasants before harvest at low prices. In bad harvest years,
the peasants often had to sell their cattle and equipment to repay
the state. He also reformed the land-lease laws which had
prevented peasants from surrendering their leases, even if the land
no longer yielded enough crops to pay the lease, until others made
higher bids for them. The new laws called for a fixed-term lease
which the peasant, upon expiration of the lease, could freely choose
to retain or surrender. [Ref. 7, pg. 180]
Under Hammuda Bey, Tunisia reemerged as a Mediterranean
power, able to threaten piracy to force the small European states to
give him fixed annual presents. He was careful not to burden the
treasury with his personal expenditure, encouraged industry by
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wearing locally produced garments, and encouraged his ministers
and government officials to take an interest in agriculture by riding
every week to his estate to supervise work in person. He delegaced
to the ulama the tasks of administering justice, but looked
personally into complaints about the conduct of government agents.
He established direct personal contacts with the chiefs of the tribes
and consulted them in affairs of their people. And he encouraged his
provincial governors to express their opinions about state matters
freely even when critical of his actions. [Ref. 7, pg. 181]
B. MODERNIZATION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
These improvements, unfortunately, did not last as subsequent
beys became removed from their people and their extravagances
generated repeated increases in taxes. As the beys found their
authority declining in the face of the growing political and
commercial power of Europe and the deteriorating social and
economic situation within the country, they attempted to deal with
the situation by building up a modern military and civil service.
France's annexation of Algeria in 1834 followed by the reassertion
of Turkish sovereignty in Tripoli in 1837 concerned Ahmed Bey
(1837-55) who intended to preserve Tunisia's autonomy from the
Ottoman Empire and did not want to create a situation which would
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give an excuse for foreign intervention in Tunisia. Slavery was
completely abolished and privateering suppressed in response to
European objections. [Ref. 8, pg. 27-28]
Ahmed Bey founded a military academy which he staffed with
European advisers, equipped his soldiers with new weapons and
uniforms and attempted to create a modern navy. His successors,
Mahammad Bey (1855-9) and al-Sadiq Bey (1859-81) were not as
enthusiastic about reforms as Ahmad, but they were convinced by
advisers and pressured by foreign diplomats into making some
significant technical and constitutional advances. [Ref. 9. pp. 226-7]
In 1857 Muhammad Bey attempted to introduce a positive
reform plan which stated as a principle that all individuals had the
right to liberty and security before the law and that there should be
complete equality between Muslims and non-Muslims. [Ref. 10, pg.
129] He also extended to Europeans the right to own land in Tunisia.
The latter half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
of the Islamic world witnessed the rise of a number of Islamic
reformers, or "early modernists", struggling to give form to the
regional political entities emerging from the crumbling empire. In
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Europe had produced the
ideological basis for political legitimacy independent of religious
institutions. Independent nation-states broke the economic and
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political bonds which kept them subservient to the central
religiously legitimized powers, and at the same time, struggled to
replace the universal Church as the community of highest allegiance.
No longer did rulers derive their legitimacy from God or through
God's representatives. Leadership was autonomous of the Church.
It was the challenge of these same issues that caused the rise of the
early modernists in the Ottoman Empire. [Ref. 32, pp. 284, 286-7]
A Tunisian constitution, the Arab world's first, was drafted in
1861 creating a consultative assembly as well as a penal court and a
court of appeals. Technical reforms during this period included
roads, railways, telegraph lines, a restoration of the Roman
aqueduct from Zaghouan to Tunis, sewers, quarantines, and
vaccinations. [Ref. 9. pg. 227]
The constitution converted Tunisia, in theory, into a limited
monarchy. In practice, however, the experiment failed and the
constitution was suspended four years after its promulgation
following an uprising in 1864. The Tunisian reformers were few,
and without the support of the consuls of the economically and
militarily more powerful European countries, they had no means of
getting the Bey or his prime minister, who were unwilling to
concede any of their authority, to comply with the decisions of the
supreme council. The European powers, especially France, however,
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had no interest in fostering political reforms which did not benefit
them directly or which might help improve Tunisia's ability to
govern itself more effectively.
The leading ulama of the country disapproved of the
constitutional innovation which deprived them of their traditional
position as counselors of the Bey and implied that political
authority could be legitimized by a means other than the upholding
of Islamic law. They expressed their disapproval by withdrawing
from the commission which drafted the constitution and remained
aloof from the process. [Ref. 7, pp. 278-79]
The 1864 rebellion occurred in response to the brutal fiscal
impositions of the government and the opening of the Tunisian
economy. It came about as the culmination of a half century of
governmental reforms, increased European interventionism, and the
commercialization of agriculture. To pay for these reforms, the Bey
had doubled and then redoubled the chief land tax. A new tax, majba
(capitation tax) had been created in 1857 and was increased to pay
for Tunisia's first European loan which was contracted in 1863—35
million francs at an estimated effective interest rate of nearly 100
percent. [Ref. 11, pg. 99] The revolt began with the rural
populations and spread to the urban populations.
"In each city, the rebellion appears to have been
precipitated by the arrival of bands of pastoralists and
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nearby villagers at the city walls. They called for the
town to join forces with them, and a large and unruly
crowd gathered at the chief mosque to decide what to do.
At this meeting, the religious authorities, and in some
instances the civil ones as well, were compelled by the
crowd to reject the authority of the Bey, and to establish
an interim governing committee for safekeeping. The
committee was composed of leading members of the
ulama ...together with several of the leading insurgents.
Their mandate was to maintain order and to serve as the
spokesmen of the rebels.
Initially the demands of the insurgents focused
upon ending the hated new taxes, the majba, and other
impositions, and abolishing the constitution and the
mixed courts. But within a few months they had
escalated to include the Thirteen Demands, which in
addition to the above included amnesty, the abolition of
foreign extraterritorial rights, the application of the
Shariah and the return of various taxes to their former
levels and administrative practices to their former
state." [Ref. 4, pp. 340-41]
The insurrection lasted for nine months and was put down only
after a European show of force and brutal repression.
Several additional loans had been contracted in the aftermath
of the revolt, all on extremely disadvantageous terms, and the
repression of the revolt had left the country's tax base a fraction of
what it had been a decade earlier. Unsuccessful attempts to
negotiate a loan in 1869 precipitated a government default on its
payments to its European creditors and that year Britain, France and
Italy established an International Financial Commission to supervise
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the reorganization of the Tunisian budget. The commission
negotiated the consolidation of the government's foreign debts and
began attempts to reorganize its internal financial system. The
military academy established by Ahmad Bey was closed, the army
reduced from more than 40,000 troops to 9,000 troops, and the naval
budget cut. The majba was revived, but at a lower rate and taxes on
wheat and barley were reduced. [Ref. 11, pp. 101-2]
C. KHAIR AL-DIN-AN EARLY MODERNIST
Despite the collapse of the constitution, the attempts at
political reform continued, especially under the premiership in the
1870s of Khair al-Din, a representative of the Ottoman elite. Khair
al-Din and other like-minded Tunisian officials and thinkers still
retained hopes of progress and development for the country as an
autonomous region of the Ottoman Empire. [Ref. 10, pg. 530]
Khair al Din studied and admired Europe's political, social and
economic institutions and proposed that the Muslim peoples should
take over the best of them. There was no question of abandoning
Islam for the sake of progress because, in Khair al-Din's view, the
progress of Europe had nothing whatever to do with its being
Christian. Christianity aims at happiness in the next world and not
in this. "If it were a cause of worldly progress, the Papal state
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would be the most advanced, not the most backward state in
Europe," he wrote. [Ref. 10, pg. 138]
Similarly, he did not even consider the dissolution of the
Ottoman Empire. On the contrary, he took it for granted that it was
the protector of the Islamic community, and if he advocated the
introduction of constitutionalism, representative institutions and
freedom of the press it was to strengthen the empire by improving
relations between the rulers and their subjects. [Ref 10, pp. 138-39]
Khair al-Din called for political justice as the basis of
progress. The power of the Bey, he argued, should be limited by the
ulama, who should function as a parliament. Government, he
believed, should promote science, industry, agriculture, and
commerce. As the reform effort depended upon the support of the
ulama, he tried to persuade them to accept the European methods of
government. He justified this by couching his arguments in the
classic Islamic political terms of the responsibility of governments
for their subjects. [Ref 6, pp. 697-8]
But he was also, more than most other Tunisian leaders,
conscious of and concerned over European, particularly French,
ambitions in the country. And he shared with other nineteenth-
century Muslim reformers the naive conviction that cultural
borrowing could be restricted to specific areas, so that the Islamic
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society would be rejuvenated while retaining its religious beliefs
and values. [Ref. 7, pg. 285]
At the Congress of Berlin in 1878 Britain and France made a
secret deal: Paris would recognize British primacy on the island of
Cyprus and London would acknowledge the demand of Paris for a free
hand in Tunisia. In 1881 a French army crossed into Tunisia from
Algeria on the pretense that the soldiers were pursing Algerian
rebels. [Ref 12, pg. 174]
Long-range French political and economic interests in Tunisia
went well beyond the momentary question of frontier security. The
Bey's leanings toward Italy as well as a colony of Italian settlers
had given substance to French alarm at Italian claims to a sphere of
influence in Tunisia. Economically, the French argued that Tunisia
was a backward and impoverished country incapable of coping with
its indebtedness. The French demanded that the Bey sign a treaty
which, in theory, left Tunisian sovereignty unimpaired, but
sanctioned the temporary military occupation of strategic points in
Tunisia to put an end to disorders there. The Bey signed the treaty,
but as soon as French troops were withdrawn, he disavowed it
claiming he had signed it under duress.
The French responded swiftly and reinvaded Tunisia a few
weeks later, occupied Tunis and subjected Sfax to a naval
22
bombardment. By June of 1883, Tunisian resistance had been
crushed and a humiliated Ali Bey (1882-1900) accepted the French
protectorate. [Ref. 8, pp. 30-31]
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IV. THE PROTECTORATE
A. TUNISIA UNDER FRENCH REFORM: 1881-1907
Although the French rule was consistently portrayed as the
benevolent tutelage of a backward people for their own benefit, the
French administration was never designed to advance the interests
of the Tunisians as a whole. The architects of the Protectorate
regime concerned themselves somewhat with the welfare of the
Tunisian population, but efforts to improve the lot of the average
Tunisian were secondary to the purposes of French control. French
rule in Tunisia was to profit France primarily by guaranteeing the
security of Algeria and by offering an unobstructed field for French
colonization and commerce. [Ref.1l, pg. 188] The Bey was allowed
to remain in office even though he had no real power.
French policy in Tunisia during the 1881-1907 period seemed
to be based on the following premise: endowing Tunisia with French
educational, judicial and administrative institutions would at once
facilitate European colonization and raise up generations of loyal,
French-speaking Tunisians. [Ref. 9, pg. 235]
Under the French, Tunisia's economy experienced a revival. The
French reform was thorough. In addition to restructuring
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governmental functions which created a more efficient, professional
system, the shariah courts, which administered law affecting the
personal status of Tunisians in such areas as marriage and
inheritance, were gradually overlaid by the French legal code,
particularly laws of property. While Tunisians retained their court
system for civil cases, all criminal cases were reserved for French
courts. [Ref. 8, pg. 34]
The apparent acceptance of Tunisians of the French in the first
25 years of the protectorate is attributed to the fact that prior to
the protectorate, the Tunisian government had not been
representative. Therefore, Tunisians were not disturbed by the
paternalistic nature of the protectorate. Additionally, the
politically conscious leaders of the capital, most of whom were
followers of Khair al-Din, viewed the French rule as an instrument
of modernization. At the beginning of the twentieth century some of
these reforming intellectuals, calling themselves the Young
Tunisians, came into the open in favor of creating a modern liberal
Tunisian state through cooperation with France. They advocated
education of women, attacked the Sufi shaykhs who they held
responsible for the spread of religious superstition, and were even
willing to accept French colonization as long as it helped to
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introduce modern methods of farming and the Tunisians were not
deprived of their best lands. [Ref 7, pg. 296]
B. THE REVIVAL OF NATIONALISM
Most Western historians place the beginnings of Tunisian
nationalism with the Young Tunisian movement after the turn of the
century, ignoring the reformist movements of the nineteenth
century. Attempting to emulate the Young Turk reformers in the
Ottoman Empire, the Young Tunisian movement, in 1908, called for
the restoration of the authority of the Bey along with reforms on
democratic lines. [Ref. 14, pg. 846]
The first violent Tunisian reaction against European influence
occurred in 1911. The Djellaz Cemetery affair erupted when it was
rumored that inalienable religious land was threatened. Although
the French Consultative Council assured the Sheikh-el-Medina
(religious and secular head of the Arab section of Tunis) that no such
land would be touched, a riot had already broken out. An estimated
nine Europeans were killed and twenty injured, while the Tunisian
casualties were unreported. Although no evidence connected the
Young Tunisians with this incident, they did support a subsequent
tramway strike. [Ref. 15, pp. 93-4]
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An accidental death on February 9, 1912, in which an Arab
child was struck down by a tram operated by an Italian, worsened
the situation. Arabs boycotted the trams, demanded that no Italians
be allowed to drive trams and that equal pay be given for equal work
regardless of nationality. More bloodshed followed and when the
strike did not end by the deadline set by the French Resident-
General, the Young Tunisians were arrested. Four of them were
labeled Communists and deported, the rest imprisoned. Nationalist
newspapers were suppressed, and a state of emergency was
proclaimed that lasted until 1921. With the major leaders gone, the
nationalists confined their activities to anti-French pamphlets, but
this lead to searches and more arrests of nationalists and their
detention for the duration of World War I. French prisons supplied a
continuous line of martyrs for the cause of Tunisian nationalism.
[Ref. 15, pg. 94]
Although the ulama had initially resisted the protectorate and
its policies, the rise of Tunisian nationalism presented a greater
threat. The militant journalists, whose numbers mushroomed during
periods of tolerance, considered themselves watchdogs of the public
interest and spokesmen of the Tunisian people. In so doing not only
did they presume to exercise functions traditionally performed by
the ulama, but they even had sufficient gall to criticize the religious
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leaders. The French, who had always treated the ulama with
circumspection in order to minimize their opposition to French
reforms, began to curry the support of the whole religious
establishment. From about 1907, the French instituted an "orthodox
policy" claiming the need to protect shariah institutions from the
irreverent Tunisian nationalists. While the Tunisian ulama
withdrew as much as possible from the political currents of the
nationalist period, allegations that the Tunisian ulama sided with
the French against the nationalists largely explains the ruthlessness
with which the religious leaders were stripped of their remaining
functions and authority at independence. [Ref. 9, pp. 238-40]
Tunisian nationalists emerged from the war better organized
and more ready for their struggle. President Wilson's Fourteen
Points, including self-determination, had made the U.S. president a
hero to oppressed peoples throughout the Arab world. On January 2,
1919, Tunisian leaders sent a cable to President Wilson in Rome
enlisting his assistance. In February, a memorandum on the French
Protectorate was presented to the American President. This
memorandum asked for the independence of Tunisia as the ultimate
aim. It explained the origin of the imposed French Protectorate and
dealt with Tunisian grievances at some length. Although the U.S. had
refused to officially recognize the French protectorate until 1917,
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under the influence of a wartime alliance, it remained reluctant to
become involved in France's colonial affairs. When Tunisian
delegates failed to obtain any concessions from France at the Peace
Conference in Paris later that year, Tunisians were left to conclude
that their problem was Tunisian-French in essence, and had to be
dealt with along Franco-Tunisian channels. [Ref. 16, pp. 90-91]
C. FROM NATIONALISM TO ANTI-COLONIALISM
The decade of the 1920s saw a shift in Tunisia's political
movement from nationalism to anti-colonialism. This was the
period when the Destour (or Constitution—in reference to the
Constitution of 1861) party, founded in 1920, acted as the
spokesmen of Tunisia's politically conscious groups. They vainly
tried to convince France that it was time for political reform. When
this failed, they presented their demands to Naceur Bey. Their eight
demands were:
1. an assembly of both Tunisians and French elected by
universal suffrage;
2. institution of a government responsible to this assembly;
3. separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers;
4. access of competent Tunisians to all administrative posts;
5. equal salary and treatment of elected municipal
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governments;
6. institution of elected municipal governments;
7. privilege of Tunisians to purchase land on an equal basis
with the French; and
8. freedom of the press, assembly and association.
The addition of an obligatory educational system was soon
added. A copy was sent to the French resident-general. The
demands were largely ignored by the French, who dealt with the
issue by promising to carry out broad measures of political reform,
but which were in reality mainly administrative and did not
significantly shift the power of government from France to Tunisia.
[Ref. 15, pp 97-98]
Under French control, mechanisms for the near-monopoly of
the use of force were perfected and the state became better
equipped to interfere in the daily political and economic lives of the
Bey's subjects. The primacy of the State in reorganizing the
economy continued and state-building was linked to
commercialization of the economy. By the time of the Depression of
the 1930s, the policies of the protectorate were not only profiting
French interests in Tunisia, they were clearly and seriously
detrimental to the well-being of the vast majority of Tunisians, rich
and poor alike. [Ref. 11, pp. 220-223]
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D. BOURGUIBA AND THE NEO-DESTOUR
In 1934, the Neo-Destour party came into being as a result of
dissatisfaction by newer members of the Tunisian elite. Tunisia's
new elites were increasingly coming from poorer backgrounds and
competing with the scions of the old Tunis families in the prestige
professions and for appointment to the high administrative jobs
open to Muslims. Neo-Destour leaders introduced into Tunisian
politics not so much a new political aim, but a new style of action, a
greater sense of mission and commitment, and the will not only to
achieve independence but also to create a new society. Habib
Bourguiba, represented this orientation and led the Neo-Destour
from the start.
Bourguiba, a lawyer, had obtained his legal training in France.
He returned to Tunisia in 1927, with his French wife, to practice
law, but found he was not accepted by either the French or the
Tunisian elites. Frustrated, he had gone into politics. Bourguiba's
first arrest in 1934 was as a result of the disturbances which
occurred between the Neo-Destour and the Old Destour. The Neo-
Destour was formally banned six months after its foundation and
remained illegal for the following twenty years. [Ref. 7, pp. 358-61]
Bourguiba realized that for France to recognize the Neo-
Destour it needed to prove that the party was the true
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representative of Tunisians. However, it was not until he began to
couch his speeches in Islamic terms that he began to get the
attention of the masses. Islam played a critical role in the Tunisian
nationalist movement. It incorporated a system of concepts and
symbols which the common man identified and whose language he
understood. Islam was communication between this "new"
leadership and the masses. [Ref. 17, pg. 92]
Against the backdrop of the dismal economic conditions of the
1930s, the Neo-Destour rapidly gained in popularity. Its implicit
promise was the fruits of independence, for which the new party
struggled openly. Equal pay and more jobs in the government,
equitable economic policies, land, and political rights were all part
of the promise of self-rule and independence. By 1937, the party
was reported to have established an "Aid Service for the Indigent
and Unemployed" which had, according to French reports,
"contributed significantly. ..in extending Neo-Destour activity among
the disinherited masses of the interior where it has branches". [Ref.
11, pp. 254-55]
A common tactic that France used in Tunisia was the
accusation that the nationalist leaders were communistic. Although
it was almost entirely spurious this charge carried great weight on
the French domestic scene where the spread of communism into
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Western Europe was considered a great menace. The climax between
the Neo-Destour and the Protectorate came on April 9, 1938, a day
now celebrated in Tunisia as Martyrs' Day. When a mob in front of
the French Residence protested the arrest and trial of a popular
leader, they were dispersed only to appear the next day by the
thousands. The troops fired into the crowd killing 122 and wounding
62. A state of siege was proclaimed and the wholesale arrest of
Neo-Destourian leaders began. Sabotage, arson, mutiny and bombings
followed and although Bourguiba was once again in prison, the party
was now well enough organized to keep up the terror. [Ref. 1 5, pp.
100, 106]
During WWII, the nationalists were as concerned as France by
the large number of Italians in the protectorate and the threat of
Italian fascism. Even the fall of France in 1940 did not stir the
Tunisian nationalists to violence against France as an Axis victory
was still considered a greater threat than colonialism.
In 1942, Moncef Bey, demanded that the Vichy government
grant major reforms giving the Tunisians more power and influence
in government. The French responded by asking the Bey to abdicate.
When he refused, he was removed from the throne and died in exile in
Algeria in 1948. The throne went to Sidi Lamine who was willing to
cooperate. [Ref. 1 5, pg. 1 1 3]
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Tunisian nationalist hopes for U.S. support for their cause
were dashed a second time when, following the 1943 allied invasion
of North Africa and the expulsion of Axis forces from Tunis, the U.S.
refused to support Tunisian independence against its Free French
allies. At the end of the war, the French refused to recognize
Tunisian contributions to the war effort by granting independence
and the struggle was renewed.
Following WWII, Tunisia again turned to the U.S. Through
contacts between the American labor unions, the American
Federation of Labor (AFL) and the Congress of Industrial
Organizations (CIO) and Tunisia's Union Generale Des Travailleurs
Tunisiens (UGTT), Bourguiba was able to visit the U.S. and present
the Tunisian case to key political figures [Ref. 17, pg. 117]. In the
post-war period, American views on the rights of colonial peoples
came into more obvious contradiction with feelings of solidarity
and appreciation toward wartime allies. The extent to which the
U.S. should support independence for the colonies or press
concessions on the colonial powers was the subject of heated
debates within government councils. The advent of the Cold War
soon made this more than a moral dilemma. The importance of the
Mediterranean in the defense of European allies and alliance
solidarity overshadowed the issue of decolonization. [Ref.18, pg.39]
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The U.S. abstained from voting in 1952 when the Asian-African
bloc asked the U.N. Security Council to study French repression in
Tunisia. Although the U.S.S.R. backed the study, U.S. abstention
amounted to a negative vote that blocked the debate. In 1953
Washington opposed another U.N. resolution urging France to take the
necessary steps leading to full Tunisian sovereignty and failed to
react to the (third) imprisonment of Bourguiba. [Ref. 19, pg. 118]
France's humiliating defeat in Vietnam, its involvement in
Algeria's struggle for independence, and growing opposition within
France toward France's foreign involvements finally prompted it to
grant Tunisia's independence on March 20, 1956. Bourguiba




A. CREATING THE NEW TUNISIA
Elections for the Constituent Assembly, immediately held on
March 25, resulted in all 98 seats being won by the National Front.
Bourguiba became Prime Minister on April 11, leading a government
in which 16 of the 17 ministers belonged to the Neo-Destour.
The bey, Muhammad al-Amin, was the object of constant
criticism from Tunisian nationalist leaders, who accused him of
reluctance to participate actively in the struggle for independence
and of being apt to rely on French support. After independence his
remaining powers were whittled away and on July 25, 1957, the
Constituent Assembly decided to abolish the monarchy, proclaim
Tunisia a republic and invest Bourguiba with the powers of head of
state. [Ref. 14, pg. 448]
The necessities of immediate nation building, undertaken by
the new political organization under the charismatic leadership of
Bourguiba, pressured Tunisian society into accepting and actively
supporting a single-party political system. The party minimized
political debate, eliminated potential opposition (such as the
assassination of Salah ben-Youssef in 1961), and devoted itself to
36
the tasks of mass education and economic development. Thus, the
leadership of the country exerted economic and sociocultural as well
as political dominance, and the incumbent political leadership
appeared to be the only elite worthy of recognition. [Ref. 39, pg. 144]
President Bourguiba embarked upon an unprecedented program
to modernize the state religion. A personal status code suppressing
polygamy was enacted, religious courts were suppressed, and the
religious endowments were nationalized. The status of the historic
Zeitouna University, a major religious school, was downgraded, and
workers were encouraged to break the Ramadan fast, one of the five
pillars of Islam. In his most notorious action, Bourguiba publicly
drank a glass of orange juice during the fast and explained that
those who were working, like himself, were excused from fasting.
[Ref. 20, pg.100]
To make his proposal more palatable, Bourguiba asserted that
Tunisia was engaged in a jihad against underdevelopment and that
Islam excused participants in a jihad from fasting. However,
Bourguiba miscalculated the depth of popular attachment to
tradition. Almost all Tunisians observed the fast. Even those who
were not particularly religious regarded Ramadan and the various
festivities and customs associated with it as symbols of their
Arabo-lslamic heritage. Even in the upper echelons of the Neo-
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Destour, Bourguiba's public breaking of the fast and his urging
others to do likewise had limited support. Many religious leaders
openly rejected Bourguiba's reinterpretation of Ramadan, which they
considered the last straw in a series of government infringements
on religion. Most of those criticizing Bourguiba were quickly
removed from their posts. Just before Ramadan in 1961,
antigovernment demonstrations erupted in Kairouan (a city of
religious significance as it was built by the first Muslims in North
Africa), but were quickly crushed. This incident, however, sent a
signal to Bourguiba that he could only go so far in forcing religious
changes without creating a dangerous backlash. [Ref. 21, pp. 119-
21]
Islam was not the only target of Bourguiba's new Tunisia. He
also eschewed pan-Arabism in favor of developing a local, secular
Tunisian nationalism. [Ref. 22, pg. 181] Bourguiba pointed out that
Tunisia's culture began well before the Arab invasion and the
subsequent adoption of Islam. He strongly disagreed with Egypt's
President Nasser over many fundamental issues and did not approve
of Nasser's confrontation politics with Israel. As a protest of
Nasser's domination of the Arab league, Tunisia did not join the
organization until 1958, although it joined the United Nations
immediately. [Ref. 21, pg. 160] Between 1959 and 1961, Bourguiba
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severed ties with the Arab League in response to the spread of
Cairo-sponsored pan-Arabism in Tunisia. [Ref. 28, pg. 747]
By the early 1970s there was evidence that an Islamic
movement was underway. The movement sought to reassert
religious influence in areas from which the regime had attempted to
exclude it, including the political process. Islamists decried the
identification of modernization, which they did not generally oppose,
with Westernization, which they blamed for the alleged decline of
moral values in Tunisian society. Although many observers suggest
that the government had tacitly encouraged the movement's
activities as a counterweight to left-wing critics of the private
enterprise policy, the Muslim revivalists could not long serve the
purposes of the new bourgeoisie. They opposed the continued foreign
influence in the economy and society, decried the reliance on
tourism-the country's major earner of foreign exchange-and
objected to Bourguiba's secularization policies. [Ref. 23, pg. 245]
Tunisia's former colonial power had exacerbated the conflict
between acceptance and rejection of the West. In the first few
years following independence, relations with France passed through
three major crises. The first occurred in February 1958, when
French forces attacked the frontier village of Sakiet Sidi Youssef,
which was allegedly harboring Algerians, and killed some eighty
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Tunisians, including children. It took the intervention of the U.S. and
Great Britain to smooth things over between France and Tunisia.
Nonetheless, the U.S. made it clear at this time that it considered
North Africa within the French sphere of influence. [Ref. 17, pg.
162]
The second crisis came when France agreed to limit its troops
to a few isolated posts in the Sahara and its large naval base at the
city of Bizerte. Tunisians chafed at the extensive operations at the
Bizerte installation. When France expanded its facilities there in
1961, despite persistent Tunisian objections, Bourguiba demanded
the base's evacuation. France refused and fighting began between
French and Tunisian troops. In the ensuing combat, the French
captured the road and railway linking Bizerte to Tunis as well as
large parts of the city itself. The Tunisians sustained thousands of
casualties. [Ref. 21. pg. 163]
Tunisia quickly brought the Bizerte issue before the United
Nations which partially supported Tunisia's position by calling on
France to withdraw to the confines of its bases, and by urging
bilateral negotiations to determine the base's ultimate fate. France
ignored the U.N. decision and continued to occupy the city for several
weeks. It also postponed discussions over the final disposition of
the base until after the Algerian War had ended the following
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summer. France finally turned the Bizerte base over to the Tunisian
naval authorities in late 1963. [Ref. 21. 163-4]
Relations between the two countries had barely begun to
improve by May 1964. when the third crisis took place. Bourguiba.
feeling he could no longer ignore internal pressures, took over all
the land (about 675,000 acres) still owned by Frenchmen. De Gaulle
particularly resented this act of nationalization because it was
carried out without any prior warning. In response, he withdrew
French financial aid and trade favors. [Ref. 24, pg. 190]
The effects of the Islamic movement were manifested in
reviewed sensitivity toward religion in the population at large and a
greater respect for Muslim customs on the part of government
authorities. Attendance at mosques for prayer noticeably increased.
The first highly visible manifestation of the Islamist discontent
that was centered in the university was the appearance of a young
female instructor, dressed in traditional garb, on a nationally
televised program marking the beginning of Ramadan in 1975, during
which she challenged government policies in the presence of
Bourguiba. [Ref. 8, pp. 125-6]
The Islamists were not the only group criticizing Bourguiba.
By 1977, there were signs of a succession struggle in the increasing
demands for the free development of a multi-party democracy from.
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among others, former ministers Ahmad ben Salah, in exile, and
Mahmoud Mestiri, leader of the unofficial liberal group of the Social
Democrats (MDS). From June to August 1977, 33 members of another
opposition party, the Popular Unity Movement (MUP). which had been
declared illegal in 1973, were arrested and tried on charges of
threatening state security and defaming the President. The
government's actions indicated the continuing hostility of the
government to any form of organized opposition. [Ref. 14, pg. 850]
By 1981, Bourguiba, apparently concerned that the criticisms
of the Muslim groups threatened the stability of his regime,
acquiesced to urging by Prime Minister Mzali that the state's
commitment to capitalist development be matched with political
democratization. [Ref. 23, pp. 246-7] In April 1981. Bourguiba
declared that he saw no objection to the emergence of political
parties provided that they rejected violence and religious
fanaticism and were not dependent "ideologically" or "materially"
on any foreign group (effectively eliminating the communists and
Islamists). [Ref. 37, pg. 31133]
The National assembly elections of November 1981 were to be
openly contested. Tunisia's labor union, the UGTT and the Neo-
Destour ran joint lists in a "National Front", and three other groups
were permitted to present candidates. The announcement of the
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elections, made in April, suggested that any group winning over 5
percent of the vote would be permitted to form a legal political
party. [Ref. 23, pp. 246-7]
Bourguiba's decision to open the political process to other
parties was designed to weaken opposition to the government by
removing one of the major political grievances against the regime.
It also permitted the regime to move against its most immediate,
and perhaps most dangerous, opponents well before the elections. In
May, several leaders of the Muslim renewal groups established the
Movement of the Islamic Way (MTI), with an eye to contesting the
November elections. In September, after anti-Bourguiba speeches
were reportedly given in mosques, the regime cracked down on the
group: sixty-eight were arrested, tried and convicted of defaming
the president and sentenced up to twelve years in prison. Rachid
Ghannouchi was among those arrested. [Ref. 23, pg. 247]
B. GHANNOUCHI
Rachid Ghannouchi was born in 1941 in an oasis. Al-Hama, in
a region close to the Libyan border. He was forced to leave primary
school for two years because of the poverty of his family. He
completed his education in the traditional school system of the
Zitouna Mosque, whose instruction in Arabic did not prepare for
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higher education in Tunisia, because the latter was exclusively
taught in French. He began his career as a primary school teacher,
and was able to earn enough money to continue his education. A
supporter of Nasser's pan-Arabism (which he confused with
Islamism, as many Tunisians did at this time), he went to Egypt
where university education was given in Arabic. When Tunisia
severed relations with Egypt, Ghannouchi found himself threatened
with expulsion. He went to Damascus and graduated from Damascus
University in Philosophy and Social Science. [Ref. 29. pp. 213-4]
The defeat of the Arab states in 1967 convinced him that
Islam was the only force of resistance able to oppose the policy of
domination of the Western powers. However, like all Tunisians of
his generation, he was fascinated by the West. While in Syria, he
visited several European countries and. upon completion of his
studies, he went to Paris where he spent a year working as an
immigrant in order to prepare for his doctorate on Muslim
philosophy. The death of his mother ended his plans and on his
return to Tunisia at the beginning of the 1970s, he was rapidly
integrated in a group, the Association for the Preservation of the
Quran, that organized discussions and studies in mosques. [Ref. 29.
pp. 214-5]
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C. THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT IN TUNISIA
In the late 1960s, the Pakistan-based Da'wa gained a foothold
in Tunisia. The Da'wa in Pakistan had been formed around the
writings of Abul Ala Mawdudi, a Pakistani who began his career as a
journalist and is now viewed as a pioneer in the Islamic reform
movement.
Mawdudi's writings were influenced by the events in India
before independence. He did not believe that the Muslims of the
subcontinent constituted one nation along with all other Indians. He
insisted that the Muslims had an identity or nationality of their own
which was Islam; they were bound together not by ties of race,
geography, language, or culture, but by their commitment to follow
the will of God in their lives. To Mawdudi, democracy was the
tyranny of the majority, and since the Muslims in India were the
minority, this was unacceptable. Mawdudi was concerned with the
restoration of Islamic society to its former glory and his
voluminous writings espoused the concept of an Islamic state which
was all encompassing. Social change required first changing the
theoretical views of leadership, which society would then follow,
hence it was not a mass based movement. Mawdudi's shortcomings
were his inability to relate his ideas to the solving of everyday
problems and because his monolithic ideology did not allow for
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dissension or diversity, he viewed criticism as rejection of his
beliefs. As a result, he was feared and disliked by many in his own
country. [Ref. 26, pp. 102-3, 128-30]
The application of the Da'wa in toto to Tunisia had its
drawbacks and in 1974, there was a split in the movement. While
part of the movement continued with the Da'wa ideology (later
becoming known as the Group of the Call and Communication), the
dissenters, who had decided to follow the path of the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood, became known as the Islamic Group. The
Da'wa's emphasis was on the individual and personal uprightness,
while the Islamic Group began by emphasizing Islamic conviction and
character and issues of thought, culture, and society. The Da'wa, as
their name implies, travel in groups "calling" to people to listen to
Islamic lessons. Although they are not concerned with political
activism, their "calling" caused problems with the government.
Another split occurred when members within the Islamic
Group questioned the group's approach, especially in light of the fact
that the brotherhood had failed to realize its goals in spite of nearly
fifty years of struggle. In 1978-79, they formed an independent
association of Islamicist thinkers that they named the Progressive
Islamists. Their focal point is the search foi a modern Islamic
thought able to lead Muslims in the work of building a civilization
46
that will be both fully Islamic and fully in touch with the modern
age.
The Islamic movement, encountering harsh opposition from the
Tunisian government and faced with difficult challenges in the form
of severe social problems, became politicized. This culminated in
1981 with its self-designation as the Movement of the Islamic Way.
an official declaration of organization, and an application for
permission to exist as a licensed political group. Since the beginning
of the 1980s, there has been a shift in the movement away from the
political slogans of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as the MTI has
attempted to tailor its message to the realities of the Tunisian
situation. [Ref 27, pp. 169-79]
D. GHANNOUCHI AND THE MTI
In a series of articles, Ghannouchi had demonstrated how the
potent combination of economic hardship, lack of political
expression, and Islamic concerns had gradually politicized the MTI.
A general strike in Tunisia in 1978 and the subsequent repression
and then cooptation of the labor union movement by the government,
stood out initially as two important events in Ghannouchi's
increasing concern with political and economic rights. Two other
factors had added impetus to the Islamic movement. One was the
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active intimidation campaign the government had initiated against
the Islamists after removing MTI supporters from the Association
for the Preservation of the Quran. The second was the Iranian
revolution of 1979. Ghannouchi had initially strongly supported the
overthrow of the shah but remained ambivalent about the use of
violence, an ambiguity which was resolved after 1 980 when his
writings began to stress persuasion and consciousness-raising as a
first step toward the establishment of an Islamic state. By 1980
the MTI distanced itself from the new Iranian regime, arguing that it
represented only one particular way of establishing an Islamic state.
In Tunisia, he theorized, the change should come about by working
within the political system, and the use of violence was condemned.
The MTI's stated purpose was the recreation of an Islamic society,
however, it noted that an Islamic society must not be imposed but
must be built gradually through participation in institutions that can
be reformed. It also stated that it did not seek a monopoly on
political expression— that would only replace one dictatorship with
another. [Ref. 30. pp. 611-12]
When Ghannouchi was set free in 1984 the movement had
changed perceptibly; its leadership had partly lost control to a
number of splinter groups that espoused more violent solutions. In
1985, the MTI's official position stated that the Sharia may not
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contain the answer to every modern problem and needed to be
redefined to give it a contemporary Islamic meaning. [Ref. 30, pg. 612]
E. BOURGUIBA'S CHALLENGE
President Bourguiba became increasingly convinced that the
Islamists were a threat to his regime and increased his attempts to
suppress their activities. In July 1986, four Islamists were
sentenced to death and about 22 others were imprisoned for a series
of offenses. Dozens of arrests were reported by human rights
organizations following clashes between Islamists and left-wing
students at the University of Tunis in early 1987. In early March
1987, Ghannouchi was arrested on charges of violence and collusion
with foreign powers to overthrow the government. Later in the
month, Tunisia severed relations with Iran charging it with, among
other things, attempting to overthrow Bourguiba. On this pretext, a
wave of arrests of Islamists ensued. These actions were condemned
by the Tunisian League of Human Rights (LTDH). There were also a
number of arrests following clashes between students and police at
the University of Tunis. [Ref. 14, pg. 853]
In May, the government approved the creation of the
Association for the Defense of Human Rights and Public Liberty, as a
rival to the LTDH, which the government accused of being pro-MTI.
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In June, 37 Islamists, most students, were sentenced to terms of
imprisonment of between two and six years for taking part in illegal
demonstrations in April and for defaming Bourguiba. In the same
month, security forces announced the arrests of members of two
radical Islamic groups, alleged to have plotted acts of sabotage.
Tunisian state-sponsored newspapers published photographs of
weapons, alleged to have been discovered near Tunis, to support the
government's theory of an Iranian-backed conspiracy to overthrow
Bourguiba. The MTI denied the allegations and accused the police of
torturing MTI prisoners. In August, 1 3 foreign tourists were injured
by bomb explosions at the resorts of Monastir and Sousse, and the
government promptly insisted that the MTI was responsible. Six
young Tunisians later confessed on television to planting the bombs,
and stated that they were members of the MTI. They alleged that the
bombings were part of an operation to damage Tunisia's dependence
on tourism. [Ref 14.. pg. 853]
Ghannouchi's October 1987 trial was an embarrassment for the
government in part because Ghannouchi's interrogation and
subsequent defense presented a very different image of the
movement's activities and political program than that held by the
government. The MTI appeared to have been split over the question
of legitimate access to political participation. This split spawned a
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small clandestine wing that perpetrated acts of terror against the
state for which the state believed the entire movement responsible.
According to Ghannouchi's testimony these extremists did not
represent the rank-and-file who resolutely pursued its objectives
within the limits of the promised pluralization of the political
process. Ghannouchi's defense convincingly laid the blame for the
radicalization of the MTI squarely on Bourguiba who, in obstinately
refusing to acknowledge the indigenous roots of the movement's
grievances, attempted to portray its activities as Iranian
interference in Tunisian internal affairs.
The trials failed to produce any evidence that the MTI was
revolutionary and subversive, had used violence against the regime.
had operated clandestinely, or had, for that matter, bombed hotels in
the Tunisian Sahel. The leniency of the sentences handed down
enraged Bourguiba who ordered a retrial for early November. Prime
Minister Ben Ali was credited with recognizing the complexity of
the Islamist complaints and the gravity of their threats. On
November 7, 1987. he removed the ill and aging Bourguiba from
office. [Ref. 31, pp. 588-9]
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VI. THE NEW REPUBLIC
A. BEN ALI
Bom in Monastir in September 1936, ben All joined the army
after leaving school. He was among the first class of commissioned
officers who provided leadership for the new national army after
independence. In the course of his military training, he attended
Saint-Cyr and the French Artillery School at Chalons-sur-Marne. He
continued his studies in artillery at Fort Bliss. Texas, graduated
from the Intelligence and Military Security course at Fort Holabird.
Maryland, and eventually earned a degree in electrical engineering.
Ben All served as director of military security for 1 6 years.
In 1974 he was transferred to Rabat where he worked as a military
attache until 1977 when he was assigned to the position of director
of national security. During the UGTT labor crisis of 1978, he
coordinated the police and military response. In 1980, ben Ali was
named Tunisian ambassador to Warsaw. Recalled in 1984. in the
aftermath of the infamous bread riots, he had. by then. been
promoted to brigadier general and reassumed the post of national
security director. In October of 1984. Bourguiba elevated him to the
position of secretaiy of state for national defense and then, in April
1986, to minister of the interior. In 1987. six weeks before he was
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deposed, Bourguiba appointed ben Ali prime minister. [Ref. 31, pp.
593-4]
B. THE PROMISES
In his statement on the morning of November 7, 1987,
following the removal of Bourguiba, the new president announced
his plans for Tunisia.
"Compatriots, our people have attained a level of
vigilance and maturity that permits all sons and factions
to participate constructively in the running of their
affairs under the aegis of a republican regime that
respects the institutions and provides the prerequisites
for a responsible democracy based on the sovereignty of
the people, as provided by the Constitution.
The Constitution needs some review. This had been
confirmed today. There is no room for a life presidency,
nor for automatic succession in which the people are not
involved. Our people deserve developed and organized
political activities which truly rely on a plurality of
political parties and popular organizations....
We will take care to insure the sanctity of the law.
There is no room for repression and injustice...."
[Ref. 34, pg. 23]
The MTI issued a statement in support of ben Ali, welcoming
Bourguiba's removal from office as a positive and historic act that
ended what it called "a period of despotism in Tunisia," and said the
removal had come in time to save Tunisia from a slow and continuing
deterioration [Ref 34, pg. 26]. In an interview on November 10,
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Abdelfattah Mourou, a lawyer and secretary general of the MTI, again
commended ben Ali's actions and the movement's continued support
for democracy, but admitted a reluctance to immediately participate
in the political process:
"Our target at present is not a complete Islamic
program, but to contribute to a conscious guidance of the
Tunisian people, because we believe that political
practice comes after education. At present we do not
wish to come forward and participate in elections. We
do not seek parliamentary seats or seats of government.
What we want is to help enlighten the Tunisian people so
that they might take their affairs into their own hands
and not allow another despot to try to impose his tyranny
for another 30 years. After that comes the matter of
programs, proposals, and participation in elections. We
do not want to take part in any elections which might be
rigged or in which votes could be bought and sold. What
we want is honest elections in the public interest. This
requires the education and enlightenment of the public.
We will contribute to that." [Ref. 44, pg. 21]
An indication that ben Ali's changes might be limited came in
an interview on November 12, 1987, given by Foreign Affairs
Minister Mahmoud Mestiri in which he expanded on the new
government's plans. "We envisage multipartyism and political
plurality." Asked whether or not this included the Islamic
fundamentalists, he replied that:
"...they are not a political grouping, they are a
religious grouping. The policies of 'Bourguibaism' are
not finished, and we will continue to follow the path
which Bourguiba himself outlined, but at the same time
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rectifying the negative aspects that came apparent
towards the end." [Ref. 35, pp. 34-5]
Nine days after the coup, ben Ali again addressed the nation.
He expressed his pleasure at the response Tunisians had given him
and the need for their continued support. He restated his promises
of political liberalization.
"All of us know that our country, prior to [7
November], was experiencing a crisis manifested by a
lack of confidence in the present and future. This crisis
was caused by the danger of collapse and fragmentation
that continually threatened the state. ..and by the closed
prospects for everyone and their loss of every hope for
the desired changes....
...I pledge to you anew that we will be faithful to
our commitments, and that the government. ..will
implement the contents of our statement.... Youth, who
are the beating heart of the nation, will particularly
possess the fundamental and effective role in building
the future of Tunisia, politically, economically, socially,
and culturally, under the auspices of harmony, solidarity,
and concord." [Ref.38]
Within weeks the new government had moved decisively ahead
in its efforts to remove some of the aberrations of the Bourguiba
period that had seriously weakened the claims of enlightened rule it
had put forward in its struggle with the Islamists. The constitution
was changed to eliminate the president-for-life provision and
limited the presidency to three five-year consecutive terms.
Legislation was enacted to limit the length of time a person could
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be held in police custody without the authority of the public
prosecutor to four days and the State Security Court was abolished.
Approximately 2500 detainees, including MTI members, were
immediately released and publication of opposition newspapers was
permitted (although the government maintained control over
television and radio). The PSD was renamed the Constitutional
Democratic Assembly (RCD) and Tunisia became the first Arab
nation to ratify the U.N. convention against torture and other
inhumane or degrading treatment.
C. SIGNS OF REVERSAL
Even as pluralism was being introduced, and Western news
media were announcing the "new era" in Tunisia, there were signs
that the old pattern of personal rule was reestablishing itself. By
early 1988, there were concerns within the government over
whether or not ben All had been successful in reviving the
legitimacy of the RCD. The president's entourage was very troubled
about the lack of information about the state of mind of the Tunisian
electorate, since political polling had never been permitted. By-
elections held in December and January had only confirmed their
fears. On December 20, municipal elections in Ksar Hellal saw the
RCD defeated for the first time. Elections in Gafsa in January
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required machine intervention to ensure the experience was not
repeated. [Ref. 45, pg.18]
In April, the National Assembly passed the law authorizing
political parties. Reversing the former requirement for a minimum
of five per cent of the vote, authorization was now to be granted
unless the government objected (with reasons given) within a period
of two months. The new law prohibited parties based on "religion.
language, race or region" and required acceptance of the principles
of "human rights and the accomplishments of the nation". A number
of parties, old and new, lined up to be recognized. The exception was
the MTI which did not apply for recognition as a party throughout
1988. [Ref. 45, pg. 21]
Within the year, further reversals were taking place. A press
code adopted in 1988 required printers to deposit copies with the
information, interior, and justice ministries of all newspapers and
other publications prepared in Tunisia. Political tracts were also
required to be submitted for approval. State control of Tunisian
television slanted coverage in favor of the government and the 1988
Law of the Mosques allowed only government appointed personnel to
lead activities in the mosques without permission from the Prime
Minister's office. [Ref. 42] A new electoral code approved in July
1988 required all candidates to appear on a slate and obtain
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exclusive support of seventy-five voters within the district of
contest. Small parties like the PUP and the RSP found it difficult, if
not impossible to meet these requirements. [Ref. 45, pg. 37]
In an apparent effort to discredit the Islamic movement, ben
Ali put forward three conditions for the legalization of the Islamic
movement: first, they had to change the name of their party and take
out any Islamic connotation, secondly, they had to announce that
they do not speak for Islam since all Tunisians are Moslems, and
thirdly, they had to accept the Personal Status Code promulgated
under Bourguiba which, in part, defined the rights of women. The
Islamic movement, led by Ghannouchi who had been released from
prison in May 1988 and granted amnesty, accepted all three
conditions and changed the movement's name to al Nahdah (Rebirth
or Renaissance). [Ref. 43, pg.6]
The signing of the National Pact, in November 1988, by all
social, political and professional groups, set out guidelines on the
country's political future. Its main target was the Islamists. As
ben AN put it:
"In order to promote a consensus-based democracy,
we have called upon the different political trends as
well as the social and professional organizations of the
country to adhere to a 'National Pact'.... This Pact
constitutes a set of principles and values commonly
accepted and considered by all Tunisians to be the
foundations of the model of society we aspire to build."
[Ref. 40. pg. 2]
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At the signing ceremony of the National Pact, the president
announced that presidential and parliamentary elections would be
held in April 1989. However, opposition figures complained in
private that in the wake of the signing of the Pact, any criticism of
government policies was now rejected as unpatriotic and as
detracting from the spirit of the 7 November movement. [Ref. 41, pg.
134]
If it had been in the interest of the new government's
legitimacy to extend civil and political liberties, it was also an
astute political strategy to make allies of erstwhile critics. As the
former minister of interior and the person administratively
responsible for security forces engaged in torture and custodial ill
treatment under Bourguiba, ben Ali had frequently been a target of
criticism by Tunisian human rights activists. As president, ben Ali
appointed two founding members of the independent and respected
League of Human Rights to his new cabinet in July 1988; and a
cabinet reshuffle in April 1989 put three LTDH members in charge
of Health, Youth and Sports, Culture and Information, and Education
and Social Affairs, positions which, in reality, involved no real
power. However, through these symbolic gestures, ben Ali's
positional strength was benefitted in two ways. While these moves
were interpreted as statements of intent to reform the polity, they
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served the simultaneous purpose of coopting potential opponents and
quieting regime critics. [Ref. 70, pg. 37]
D. APRIL 1989, THE TURNING POINT
At a news conference held by Interior Minister Chedli Neffati
following the April 2, 1989 elections, it was announced that "the
Tunisian people elected President Zine El Abidine ben Ali with a
majority of 99.27 percent". In the parliamentary elections, voter
participation was declared to be 76.46 percent and the RCD received
80.84 percent of the vote thereby winning all 141 seats in the House
of Representatives. [Ref. 46, pg. 12]
The following day, the French newspaper, Le Monde, challenged
the government's figures:
"As far as we could tell during a tour of around 15
polling stations in Tunis and the surrounding district,
this mobilization did not take place. The lines waiting at
the two ballot boxes—one for the presidential election,
the other for the parliamentary election—seemed sparse.
The numerous polling stations (12,000 in the whole
country) partly explains this impression. But figures
gathered at local level gave pause for thought. In Tunis,
in a polling station reserved for women, less than one
third of the registered voters had voted 90 minutes
before voting ended. The proportion was 50 percent for
the men." [Ref. 47. pg. 17]
One of the opposition parties, the Democratic Socialist
Movement (MDS), withdrew its observers a few hours after voting
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started claiming irregularities. The biggest irregularities were the
failure to register 1.3 million eligible voters (out of an estimated 4
million eligible voters) and an apparently systematic effort to
discourage registration by young first-time voters in the cities, out
of fear that they might swell the totals of the Islamic candidates.
[Ref. 49]. Further, of the 2.7 million voters actually registered, only
2.1 million actually voted. [Ref. 45, pg. 24]
Even before the election ended, the director of political affairs
at the Interior Ministry held a press conference to protest these
accusations and to condemn alleged pressure and violence used by
the Islamic movement against the RCD's candidates. He admitted the
existence of some blunders which could be attributed to local RCD
cadres, but he said that the MDS' attitude "stems from insincerity
and undermines the democratic process." [Ref. 47, pg. 18]
The Islamists were reported to have won more than 1 3
percent of most of the votes cast, and in Tunis and its suburbs, a
much higher percentage. In February 1989, the Islamists had applied
for but been denied recognition as a legal political party. Even so.
they had carried out an active campaign throughout the country. [Ref.
48, pg. 15]
As Independents, the Islamists drew on at least three sources.
First, traditional Islam was represented by Sheikh Mohamed Lakhoua
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and Ali Lasram, both descendants of conservative families where the
imamate, or magistrature, was passed from father to son. Second,
espousing a more liberal and open Islam were modern notables from
the bar like Maitre Hila, or businessmen like Radhi Kchok, unafraid to
develop a less conventional discourse. Hila even went as far as to
regret that there was no female Islamist candidate, "since men and
women are equals." The third type of Islamicist candidate was the
radical militant, untarnished and uncompromising, spokesman of the
mustadhafin (underprivileged). As the leading candidate for the
independents in Sfax, Maitre Abdelaziz Loukil, among other things,
declared polygamy a sacred right in Islam, not to be transgressed by
law. [Ref. 69. pg. 202]
The outcome of the April elections constituted another setback
for ben Ali. It indicated for the first time, and with reasonable
clarity, the strength of the Islamist movement in Tunisia. After
having denied for several months that the Islamists represented a
viable political alternative, their strength at the elections
contradicted much of what ben All had argued. Ghannouchi. on the
other hand, left the country in protest soon after the elections
condemning the government's refusal to recognize al Nahdah as a
political party and Mourou assumed the leadership of al Nahdah.
[Ref. 41, pg. 135-6]
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While the government gave the impression that its reason for
controlling the democratic process was due to concerns over the
Islamic movement, it was moving against all opponents. In
September 1989, the unrecognized Communist Workers party
circulated a press release protesting the nighttime arrest of four
Gafsa residents charged with belonging to an unrecognized party,
defaming the head of state, and distributing tracts. It was reported
that the door of one detainee's home was broken down; she was
beaten and forced by police to abandon her infant of four months.
In another report, Professor Jelloud Azzouna, secretary-
general of the PUP, was arrested in July 1989 for having published
an article denouncing vigilante members of the police accused of
vandalizing the cars of PUP leaders. At his August trial, his lawyer
unsuccessfully argued the need for a separation of presidential
policy from the personage of the president and was herself arrested
for presenting evidence of links between the vandals and security
police. She was incarcerated and charged with spreading false
news, inciting unrest, and defaming the public security forces.
Although she was released four days later following considerable
public pressure, Azzouna received a one-yeai prison sentence. [Ref.
70, pg. 40]
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In September, 1989, ben Ali was quoted in an interview:
"In conformity with the provisions of the
Constitution, early presidential and legislative elections
were held April 2. 1989. All political trends took part in
these elections, which were held in total freedom and
openness.
Freedom of expression and association was
bolstered. Amendments liberalizing the Press Code were
adopted in order to enable the news media to fulfill the
function which is theirs in a free and democratic society.
...We are fully aware that the establishment of a
genuine democracy is a long-term effort. But the
process of change is underway. And it is irreversible.
We are determined to press ahead with our quest for the
institutionalization of democracy and the establishment
of pluralism in a context of freedom, stability and
national concord." [Ref. 40, pp. 1-2]
E. RETURN TO REPRESSION
The Islamists increased their activities in protest of the
government. In January 1990, demonstrators clashed with police
over the state's removal of an Imam from their mosque who
supported the Islamist movement. Eight people were reportedly
sentenced to eight months imprisonment and another eight got
suspended sentences. [Ref.50, pg. 7]
In February, following clashes with police, 600 students from
several universities weie taken into custody for "interrogation."
The conflict arose after students protested about libraries with no
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books, overcrowded hostels, and a heavy police presence. With
purported guidance by al Nahdah. the students had also demanded an
end to secular education and the removal of the education minister.
Approximately half of the students had their exemption from
military service revoked and were carted off to barracks, but were
later released. [Ref. 51, pg. 81] Inducting the students was a
peculiar response on the part of the government considering that the
Islamists had promised earlier not to recruit from within the
military.
During this same period, Ghannouchi visited the U.S. giving
approximately 50 lectures at major universities and research
institutions. At Georgetown University on February 7, 1990, he
pointed out the need for cooperation between the East and the West:
"Islam is committed to restoring to humanity its
common sense. The dichotomies between East and West
make no sense. The fallacy of West is West and East is
East, and never the two shall meet, is now proven false
beyond any conceivable doubt.
The terms of East and West are abstract concepts
which do not represent the reality. The West cannot be
all rationality, democracy, science, etc., and the East
cannot be all superstition, despotism and backwardness.
All positive and negative factors exist in varying degrees
in West and East.
What we need is continued and sustained
opportunities for the meeting of minds, a sincere and
honest dialogue, for cooperation in all fields of human
achievement and excellence, for sparing humanity from
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racism, poverty, pollution, drug abuse and wars."[Ref. 52,
pg. 6]
The government was apparently concerned that municipal
elections, due to be held in June 1990, should be viewed as a serious
move toward multi-party democracy. In January, Prime Minister
Karoui invited opposition leaders for discussions on the amendment
of the electoral code and access to the media. However, the
discussions were boycotted by three of the recognized opposition
parties and al Nahdah, and little progress was made. In February, the
government introduced a form of partial proportional representation,
which would effectively allocate the opposition a third of the seats.
Four political groups, including al Nahdah, protested that this would
apply only to municipal and not to general elections, and continued
to propose a boycott. In April the opposition produced a joint
manifesto, which demanded an end to the RCD's monopoly of power.
In May 1990 the electoral law was amended to introduce a form of
proportional representation in the forthcoming municipal elections.
The winning party was to gain only 50% of the seats, while the
remaining seats were to be divided between all the parties
according to the number of votes received. However, the six legal
opposition groups and al Nahdah boycotted the elections on the
grounds that they were neither free or fair. [Ref. 14, pg. 856]
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In the June elections, the RCD reported that it had won 99
percent of the vote. This did little, however, to improve ben All's
position in the eyes of Tunisians and Ghannouchi predicted that:
"The government's intransigence will lead to
bloodshed unless ben Ali follows through on pledges. ..to
recognize the aspirations of youth, to open the media to
real freedom, to allow a genuine multiparty system and
to allow the Islamic party and other opposition forces to
be legal. Instead of following through on these pledges,
the government has begun to openly harrass us." [Ref. 53,
pg. 27]
To a large degree, observers both within and outside Tunisia
continued to accept ben Ali's claim of stemming the spread of Islam
as the justification for controlling political reforms. Neighboring
Algeria had also held elections in which the Algerian Islamists
participated as a recognized political group. Mohammed Moaada.
head of the opposition party, Movement for Social Democracy (MDS),
said, "In Algeria, they held real elections. For us, it was the
opposite. If we do not solve the Islamic problem, the political
process stays in an impasse." Ali Laridh, spokesman for al Nahdah,
stated that what happened in Algeria "will give us a lot more moral
and political support. The results, he said, showed "that the best
way to deal with the Islamists is to integrate them in a peaceful
development of society. Otherwise society will develop in different
ways and there will be an explosion." [Ref. 54]
67
But within Tunisia, there were also increasingly mixed
feelings over ben Ali's intentions to pursue democracy and his
handling of the Islamists. A numbei felt that the government should
recognize al Nahdah and engage it in debate over economic and social
rather than ideological and cultural issues to determine the
movement's true platform and curb its popularity. Some felt that
ben All was genuinely committed to democracy, pointing out that
ben Ali had appointed several opposition leaders to posts within the
government. They felt that blocks to ben Ali's democratic reforms
were coming from member within the government who were acting
contrary to ben Ali's goals. Yet others pointed out that the
government's failure to recognize al Nahdah raised strong doubts
about ben Ali's dedication to democracy. [Ref. 61]
Secretary of state for religious affairs. Ah Chebbi, defended
the government's position saying that recognizing a religious party
was "as good as saying that some Tunisians are more Muslim that
others, simply because of the political party they support. That is
unacceptable." Mr. Chebbi added that Tunisia, even though officially
a Muslim country, recognized the freedom of religious practice.
"The state lias no place interfering in the individual's convictions.
But the state must intervene when a segment of the population
attempts to impose their beliefs on others." [Ref. 61 ]
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Reports of governmental and police repression continued.
Newspaper publications were suspended or banned for criticizing the
government and the publishers arrested for such charges as
"defaming the president" and "inciting the public to riot".
Detainees were being held incognito well beyond the limits
originally promised by ben Ali and the military court was reinstated.
In September 1990, Amnesty International reported its concerns:
"The organization recalls that during the last years
of the government of President Bourguiba its concerns
included arbitrary arrests, the imprisonment of
prisoners of conscience, widespread use of torture,
unfair trials, cruel and inhumane prison conditions and
the death penalty. However, the organization remains
seriously concerned at a number of violations of human
rights, including torture and the imprisonment of
prisoners of conscience and possible prisoners of
conscience, which are still taking place. It is also
concerned at the Tunisian Government's apparent
unwillingness to recognize and investigate such
abuses. ..and the failure of the government to take
measures to prevent continuing torture." [Ref. 55, pg. 2]
In November 1990, ben Ali announced the creation of a national
commission on human rights and basic freedoms but said human
rights activists should not protect people who broke the law.
Referring to complaints of human rights abuses, he was reported to
say, "It is strange to criticize the application of the law to those
who practice violence, incite disturbances and damage public and
private property." [Ref. 56, pg. 7]
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It was reported that the Gulf crisis had prompted a split in al
Nahdah. While Ghannouchi favored supporting Iraq, Mourou advocated
condemnation and the split caused the party to suspend all political
and religious activities. [Ref. 57, pg. 151] Al Nahdah's apparent
disintegration came after months of growing violence blamed on the
fundamentalists, including an attack on a local office of the RCD
which resulted in a night-watchman dying of burns after being set
on fire. Another night-watchman was badly burned, and two people
inside the office stabbed. Mass arrests followed. As many as 800
people (according to sources within the movement) were picked up,
including most of al Nahdah's leadership not already in jail or exile.
Only three members of its executive committee were left at liberty
and on 8 March they announced that they had frozen their
membership of and activities in al Nahdah because of fundamentalist
violence which they rejected. [Ref. 64, pg. 1 6] It would seem that
the government had successfully broken the movement and could
return to its stated goals of political reforms. But such was not the
case.
The May 18-24, 1991, issue of The Economist published a
searing criticism of ben Alt:
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"Since last September Tunis has turned into a
battleground between Islamic militants and a tough
regime. After a violent clash on May 8th, when at least
two students (some say six) were shot dead by the
police, the government this week set up a commission to
investigate the unrest.
The commission is to report to President Zine el-
Abedine ben Ali next month. If it were allowed to, the
commission might place much of the blame on the
president himself. When this ex-secret policeman had
Tunisia's octogenarian ruler, Habib Bourguiba, declared
senile in November 1987, he promised a 'new era' of
democracy. ..Since then Mr. ben Ali, ...has done little to
persuade Tunisians that he is any less of an autocrat....
Having split [al Nahdah] and won over his secular
opponents, the president may feel that events justify his
policies. ..But Mr. ben All's Tunisia is a disappointment.
There is no real democracy and no press freedom. The
students' deaths prompted hardly a whisper of criticism
inside or outside the government-controlled media...
Deprived of the restraint once exercised by leaders
operating in the open, the fundamentalist movement is
threatening to spin out of control. 'Now that we have
martyrs,' say the students, 'we must pursue our
struggle'." [Ref. 63, pg. 47-8]
In Tunisia, the magazine was seized from all the newsstands
[Ref. 60, pg. 1 6] John P. Entelis, Professor of Political Science at
Fordham University noted:
71
"Probably nothing so captures the country's current
decaying political situation than the communique
condemning the police killings issued out of Paris on
May 10. 1991, by nine political opponents of the regime
including such ideologically diverse figures as Mohamed
Mzali, Ahmed Ben Salah, and Rachid Ghannouchi. That ben
Ali has been able to 'unite,' however temporarily, a
laissez-faire capitalist, a militant socialist, and a
Muslim fundamentalist speaks volumes to the decline of
ben Ali's system of rule." [Ref. 71, pg. 12]
In any society there will be contests between public and
private interest; and the telling evidence about predominant
structures, particularly for newly implemented liberalizing
measures, comes not in routine, noncontroversial dealings between
state and citizen but in situations where the state must exercise
restraint in order to allow the citizen free exercise of rights or
where the state may at the least have nothing to gain in extending
rights to the citizen. [Ref. 70, pg. 38] This evidence was particularly
blatant in the government's attempt to subvert individual rights
under the guise of stopping an Islamic "plot" to overthrow the
government.
At the end of May, Interior Minister Abdallah Kallel, outlined a
plan by the Islamists to seize power by force and set up a theocratic
state. The plan consisted of: 1) distribution of anti-government
tracts; 2) demonstrations; 3) violent attacks on symbols of
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authority; 4) unrest in schools and universities; 5) as anarchy
spreads, calls for a popular insurrection. Once the army had been
deployed on the streets to restore order, fundamentalist agents in
the armed forces were to take control of the ministries and other
key points and seize power.
Of the 300 men Mr. Kallel reported to have been arrested, 100
were from the army. The others included policemen and customs
officers as well as civilians. Journalists were shown a video tape
of a military man giving details of various meetings with al Nahdah
military figures. Mr. Kallel gave an outline of al Nahdah's
organizational structure, including its secret, military wing, with
chapter and verse on dates and places of key meetings. The captured
weapons on display consisted mainly of knives, iron bars, chains and
the materials for making petrol bombs. [Ref 68, pg. 14]
In June 1991, Tunisia's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Habib
Ben Yahia, visited the U.S. In an interview, he claimed ben Ali was
sincere in his promises and had accomplished a great deal. It was
the Islamists who were creating the problem.
"We hear some say that in three years in power,
President ben Ali did not deliver much. The truth is that
in these three years we delivered more far-reaching
reforms than in any period of Tunisia's history.
President ben Ali is truly committed to democracy. His
record is here to prove the point....
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The so-called Islamists themselves were allowed
to publish a newspaper. ...Their political activity was very
much tolerated in the country. It was generally hoped
that, through these measures, they would express
themselves clearly and convincingly on the issues of the
day and progressively coax themselves into the
mainstream....
For some reason, they thought it more expedient to
muscle their way through and to target symbols of the
state through religious dogma and random violence, so as
to create a "revolutionary atmosphere" and establish a
theocracy, thus reshaping the country's social model,
with their anti-democratic means....
With the same firmness that it deals with outlaws,
the state will not tolerate any human rights abuses. All
allegations of such abuses will not be taken lightly by
the government. As emphasized by the president himself,
any complaint will be investigated and no effort shall be
spared towards the protection of human rights. The
recently created Higher Commission for Human rights and
Basic Freedoms is another manifestation of President
ben Ali's determination in this field and an illustration
of his unwavering commitment to uphold the law and
protect the rights of citizens against abuses. Faithful to
its traditions of tolerance and moderation, Tunisia will
move ahead, under the leadership of President ben Ali, on
the path of democracy, development, and stability." [Ref.
59, pp. 50-1]
If by now it was apparent that the media had given ben Ali
more credit than he deserved, some of the witnesses giving
testimony at the House of Representatives hearing on Human Rights
in the Maghreb and Mauritania (held a few days after Ben Yahia's
visit) continued to cloud the picture. Ambassador James K. Bishop,
Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau for Human Rights and
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Humanitarian Affairs, characterized Tunisia as "a pluralistic
democracy, although all 141 members of its National Assembly are
members of the RCD", due to opposition members boycotting
elections "charging. ..that the RCD had unfairly structured the
electoral code to ensure its success at the polls." Ambassador
Bishop's subsequent testimony on human rights violations and press
restrictions and harassment of journalists in Tunisia directly
contradicted his original statement that Tunisia was a "pluralistic
democracy". [Ref. 60, pp. 10, 16]
Professor Mary-Jane Deeb, Department of Government, School
of Public Affairs, at the American University, stated that "The
[Tunisian] government policy since [the removal of Bourguiba] has
been one of compromise rather than one of confrontation with the
Islamists." Professor Deeb's testimony cited incidents of violence
and reports of plots which the Tunisian government blamed on the
Islamists and pointed out that in Tunisia, as well as in Algeria, "a
large number of organizations have voiced their opposition to the
tactics used by some of the members of [al Nahdah]" including the
other opposition groups. [Ref. 60, pp. 55-7, 44]
John Ruedy, Associate Professor of Middle East and North
African History at Georgetown University, questioned whether or not
the decision to open the system had come too late. He pointed out
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that by the time the Tunisian and Algerian governments acted, the
Islamists were already the most cohesive and popular opposition
movements in the two countries.
"Now, Rashid [Ghannouchi] of the Tunisian [al
Nahdah] and Abbassi Madani of the FIS in Algeria have
pledged that their parties will play by the rules of the
game, and that they will respect their countries'
constitutional arrangements. It is not for me to question
their sincer ity, but the nature of the programs they
espouse and a sampling of the internal debate of these
movements does lead one to question whether once in
powei, either the [al Nahdah] or the FIS would continue to
maintain the pluralistic arrangements that brought them
here.
There is little, in fact, in Islamic history to
suggest that political diversity is a value deeply
treasured by Muslims or that personal freedoms at least
nominally guaranteed by existing constitutions would be
protected.
Islam, as you know, prescribes a rather narrow
path, the Sharia, which is thought by Muslims to be the
surest path both to earthly and spiritual salvation.... The
violence to which certain elements of [al Nahdah] in
Tunisia have had recourse since the middle 1 980s. ..calls
into question the solidity of the [al Nahdah's]
commitment to the existing legal framework.
...the existence of fundamentalism as the strongest
contender for [the regime's] power calls into question
the ability of the regimes to secure more than a
temporary opening of the system. Pluralism, many
people fear, would constitute a short-lived mechanism
for transferring power permanently to the Islamists."
Ref. 60, pp. 70-1]
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In her testimony, Holly Burkhalter, Washington Director,
Human Rights Watch, noted the rising number of political cases,
cases of political imprisonment, and deaths in detention through
torture. She stated that there had been three deaths in custody the
previous year, and two deaths within the last month or so. No proper
investigation of them was made. In discussions, she added:
"I know in your opening statement, both the
Chairmen described this phenomenon [the Islamic
movement] as a threat to human rights... I would like to
note that the main opposition political party in Tunisia,
the "Renaissance Party or [al Nahdah],...is one of the most
moderate of the Islamic movements in the region, and it
has for 10 years been trying to get legal recognition so
that it can function as a normal legitimate political
party like any other political party.
It has never been given legal recognition and, thus,
the members of the party are operating illegally when
they try to speak openly or organize themselves. Their
publications are closed down, as you noted in your
questioning. There is really no opportunity for these
citizens to participate peacefully in the political life of
their country. I would say that the government's
increasingly heavy-handed response to the very
legitimate political aspirations of its population, not
just the Islamic party but other critics of the
government, that is the real threat to human rights in
this country. It seems to me. ..that when human beings
are deprived of the right to participate peacefully and
when their peaceful advocates are tortured and
sometimes killed in detention and many thousands are
rounded up and students are shot, etc., that that activity
on the part of the government encourages violence and
encourages increasing tensions that you are actually
indeed seeing in Tunisia." [Ref. 60, pp. 22-3]
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James O'Dea, Director of the Washington Office of Amnesty
International, concurred with Ms Burkhalter:
"...we have the gravest concerns about the situation
in Tunisia. ..as we have heard, at least 2000 people
remain detained. People have been taken from their
homes at night. ..The situation is deteriorating and we
need to move quickly to stop the terrible deterioration in
Tunisia.
I think it is worth noting that Islamists received
18 percent of the vote in 1989, and that President Ben
Ali's claim that the Islamists are not democratic has to
be looked at. The [al Nahdah] movement has said at least
publicly that it wishes to join the democratic process,
and it is critical, if the Tunisian situation is to be
recovered, that he and his government staunchly defend
civil and political rights which can never be abrogated in
the name of defending democracy. ..he has got to defend
democracy and defend their right to enter the democratic
process." [Ref. 60, pp. 78-9]
The hearings were only one of a number of criticisms on
Tunisia's human rights violations and ben Ali moved quickly to
counter them. The government announced an enquiry into the
allegations of abuses, in apparent response to the urgings of
Amnesty International and the Tunisian Human Rights League. If the
allegations were substantiated, the appointed head of the enquiry.
Rachid Driss, an elder statesman and chairman of ben All's own
consultative council on human rights, was to recommend ways and
means of preventing any recurrence. The Tunisian League announced
it was now authorized to visit detention centers. [Ref. 65, pp. 13-4]
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In July 1991, Tunisia's and Egypt's Interior Ministers met in
Tunis to sign an unprecedented security pact on joint action against
those who "threaten state security." The pact included training for
officials and the exchange of information on Islamist organizations.
On July 11, 1991, President Mitterrand visited ben AN to
"show support" and on July 1 2, ben Ali underlined the Islamists'
international network, telling the Paris daily Le Monde that there
was not a shadow of doubt about the existence of a "Fundamentalist
International." He noted that Islamists use "terror, violence and
crime" to obtain their goal of a "theocratic state." He said that
Islamist activities were coordinated from Sudan and added that he
had "irrefutable proof, particularly videocassettes of the subversive
meeting" of international Islamists in Khartoum in May. [Ref. 58,
pg. 2]
"We don't have a religious problem in Tunisia", Ghannouchi
stated in an interview in September 1991. "It's a political problem
between the people and the elite. And we are now in an advanced
state of confrontation between dictatorship and democratic
dreams". Ghannouchi denied there had been a split in the movement.
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"There are no dissidents in our party. A few of my
brothers have left [al Nahdah] due to pressure from the
Ministry of the Interior and under threat of prison. Abdel
Fatah Mourou and four or five people involved in starting
Esh Shaab [as a moderate alternative to al Nahdah] have
achieved nothing, as ben Ali will not have anything to do
with even moderate or dissident Islamists." [Ref. 66,
pp.1 9-20]
In late September, 1991, Tunisian Republic Radio announced
the government's discovery of an assassination plot against ben Ali
by the Islamists. In a meeting, Interior Minister Kallel had
announced the plot noting that this had come at a time,
"...when President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was
engaged in his persistent work of examining large and
diversified files concerning the homeland and citizens in
order to build a democratic state founded on freedoms,
justice, and human rights, as well as making the Tunisian
citizen happy and helping him in his daily life with
support and care...." [Ref. 76]
Throughout the meeting, Kallel portrayed the movement as a
powerful, international network. He stated that a few of the
conspirators had escaped to Algeria where they are using Algeria
"as a base from which to launch the attempt to carry out these vile
acts." And,
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"The plotters. ..thought about obtaining a U.S. -made
Stinger missile. They preferred this type to other
missiles, given its precision in hitting its target....
Mohamed Chammam undertook to provide this weapon due
to his strong connections with the circles of the Afghan
mojahedin. He was also to train the team charged with
the field execution of the operation." [Ref. 76]
Minister Kallel announced that another cache of qualitatively
more advanced weapons, including pistols fitted with silencers,
rifles, hand grenades and time-bombs, had been discovered in a new
hideout in Sfax. He indicated that the plot, "...which according to
material and absolute evidence implicate[s] the so-called [al Nahdah]
Movement [and] emphasizes the deeply-rooted nature of this
movement...." Following the minister's statement, videos were
shown of four men, referred to as terrorists, confessing to the plot.
[Ref. 76, pp. 10-12]
Between July and late October 1991, five more people died
from torture while in confinement [Ref. 67]. In October, three
reported Islamists were executed for the attack on the RCD office
[Ref. 75, pg. 7].
The military takeover in Algeria in January 1992 after a
significant win by Islamists in the elections, was praised by ben Ali.
In a message of congratulations to Mr. Mohamed Boudiaf, chairman of
the Higher State Council of the Democratic and Popular Republic of
Algeria, ben Ali's relief was apparent:
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"I am pleased, on the occasion of your assuming the
chairmanship of the Higher State Council of the fraternal
Algerian Republic, to address to you and to the brother
members of the council the most sincere
congratulations, hoping that God Almighty will make you
successful in your lofty tasks in these critical and
decisive circumstances through which your dear
homeland is passing." [Ref. 77. pg. 20]
Neither the Islamists nor democracy were specifically
mentioned by ben AN in his statement.
In February, 1992, Ghannouchi accused the Tunisian government
of running a police state. In an interview, he asserted that "a fine
line separates Islamic activity from political activity, often an
unnecessary distinction, as both are invariably seen to constitute
criminal acts." He stated that the Tunisian government's only
official body ever to investigate allegations of torture in Tunisia
was composed entirely of men appointed by ben AN himself in July
1991 and the report was unlikely to be published officially. Leaked
passages, however, told of numerous cases of death by torture and
the widespread incidence of rape inflicted on the wives of arrested
Islamic party militants. Amnesty International was pressing foi the
findings to be made public.
Ghannouchi challenged the government's meaning of "the
freedom of women in Tunisia." Bourguiba's 1981 law prohibiting
women from wearing hejab [veils] to work, school or university, had
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resulted in thousands of women abandoning their work and studies.
This freedom, he said, was, "the freedom not to be Muslim."
Asked to elaborate upon al Nahdah's commitment to democracy,
Ghannouchi said it is "a way to solve political problems in a
peaceful way." He added that the Muslim interpretation of
democracy provides opportunities for ideas to be expressed and
establishes a platform for political participation. He proposed
informed debate in mosques, the media and the education system.
"Our problem" he said, "is not with certain laws but with the
absence of law." [Ref. 78, pg. 23]
In March, Tunisian secretary of state Fathi Houidi, denounced a
"damning" report by Amnesty International on continuing human
rights violations. The report observed that, rather than halting
these practices, the government appeared to be encouraging them.
"[The] President.. .set up a Tunisian commission to
conduct an inquiry into this matter, and it published a
report. It discovered a certain number of regrettable
mistakes but it also concluded that these regrettable
mistakes were not part of a policy but rather were
isolated acts. An investigation followed, and the people
in question will stand trial. Well, who could be made to
believe that despite everything in the Tunisia of change,
the Tunisia of human rights, the practice of torture is
tolerated or encouraged, as the report says? Who could
be made to believe that in the Tunisia of today there




Tunisia is perhaps distinctive in its high degree of historical
continuity which has linked the present order (the successive forms
of the Destourian Party) with the Constitution of 1861. This has
indicated a certain awareness that the fundamental issue at hand
was one of nation- or state-building and that the involvement of
France was a complicating factor in that process. [Ref. 17, pg. 24]
Bourguiba's regime became politically, however, in spite of
significant reforms in other areas, little more than a replacement
for the former colonial power. The use of force, perfected during
the Protectorate, became the main tool for maintaining power. As
the person responsible for implementing the use of force, ben Ali
continues to ensure governmental power remains in the hands of a
small group of elites. Just as the Protectorate used the label
"communism" to justify its handling of the nationalists, Ben All has
so far successfully played on both Western and other Arab leaders'
fears of Islamic "fundamentalism" to maintain at least their tacit
support.
As John L. Esposito, Director, Center for International Studies.
College of the Holy Cross puts it:
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"Whether the word democracy is used or not,
almost all Muslims today react to it as one of the
universal conditions of the modern world. To this extent,
it has become part of the Muslim political thought and
discourse. This fact must be appreciated by American
policymakers....
Government suppression, directly or indirectly
supported by Western powers, can radicalize moderates,
transforming reformers into violent revolutionaries. At
present the most likely candidate for such problems is
Tunisia.... To the extent that governments prevent
participation in elections, limit self-determination or
crackdown and imprison political activists, violence and
instability become likely....
The assumption that the mixing of religion and
politics necessarily and inevitably leads to fanaticism
and extremism has been a major factor in concluding that
Islam and democracy are incompatible. Failure to
differentiate between Islamic movements, that is,
between those that are moderate and those that are
radical (violent) and extremist is simplistic and
counterproductive. The American government does not
equate the actions of Jewish or Christian extremist
leaders or groups with Judaism and Christianity as a
whole. Similarly, the American government does not
condemn the mixing of religion and politics in Israel,
Poland, Eastern Europe or Latin America. A comparable
level of discrimination is absent when dealing with
Islam." [Ref. 62, pp. 9-12]
Having authored a number of books on his interpretations of
Islam, some analysts have alleged that Ghannouchi's shift in
philosophy over the years toward a more progressive position is
nothing more than political pandering. In January 1992, shortly
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after the military stopped the democratic process in Algeria,
Ghannouchi wrote:
"The operation aimed at excluding the Islamists
from the democratic process is justified by the
accusation that if they come to power they will
eliminate democracy— a strange justification which
leads to a contradiction: suspend democracy in order to
protect it, although in countries where there is a lot of
talk about democracy it is nonexistent and tens of
thousands of people are in jail.
But what guarantees are there that, once in power,
the Islamists will not discard democracy? Whatever
guarantees and concessions they give will always be
interpreted as tactical moves so as to consolidate their
grip on power. The fact is, though, that there are several
objective factors which will make it impossible for any
party to impose dictatorship.
...the modern education of most of the leaders of
the Islamist movement, the variety of ethical, cultural,
and political forces in the Muslim world, and the
complexity of inter-state relations—especially in the
light of the current international developments-will not
allow any particular side to impose an autocratic,
isolationist rule unless it seeks to follow a suicidal
course.
Even if one assumes that the Islamic movement is
extremist, as everyone claims, excluding it from the
democratic process will only impel it towards
extremism, which is likely to kill democratic experiment
altogether. After all, democracy is not only a method of
government, but also a philosophy of education; the West
itself did not fight left-wing and right-wing extremism
by excluding them from it.
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Can anyone deny the role of Savak and the West's
support for the Shah's repressive policy in the explosion
of popular anger in Iran and in the appearance of what is
called fundamentalism 7 Can anyone imagine what
repression of the Islamic movement in Tunisia and
elsewhere leads to in the way of deterioration of
relations in the region and with Europe?" [Ref. 72, pg. 5]
The political unrest in Tunisia presents a clear dilema for
foreign policymakers. If the goal of maintaining stability is a
priority, this requires supporting a repressive and unpopular regime
at the risk of future instability. If encouraging democracy is a
priority, inherent risks include the possible development of a new
government which might be less cooperative than the current
regime. In Tunisian, however, the Islamic movement has been
described as one of the most moderate movements and has stated its
awareness of the need for cooperation between the East and the
West.
The Western concern over mixing religion and politics
considers only the Western understanding of the meaning of politics
and the role of religion. In the West, politics is understood to be the
science or art of government. While the law is considered separate
from religious beliefs, Judeo/Christian religious principles have
provided the moral basis of constitutional law.
In Islam, "politics" commonly means a set of ideas and
institutions dealing with power, or "who gets what, when and how"
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[Ref. 17, pg. 3]. In the process of secularization, Islam, which
provided the moral framework for political responsibility, was
rejected. In these governments, there is often little or no
separation between the institutions of government and the persona
of the leader(s). Non-radical Islamic movements, such as the one
in Tunisia, are trying to recreate the moral and legal framework for
responsible, non-personalistic (i.e., democratic) governmental
institutions.
What makes Tunisia unique and important, is its
"unimportance". If stability in Tunisia has relatively little direct
importance to the U.S., this factor would appear to open the way for
greater emphasis on democracy and human rights. Tunisia presents
an opportunity for the creation of a model of an Islamic/democratic
government, the implications of which, however, are not limited to
Tunisia. Without the U.S. directly challenging other governments in
the region, such a government could serve to put pressure on
countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt to open up and reform their
own political institutions. Fostering the development of
representative governments based on a combination of Islamic and
democratic principles would appear to be the most effective way of
ensuring long-term stability in the Middle East.
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APPENDIX A - POLITICAL STRUCTURE
Official Name: Republic of Tunisia
Legal system: based on the constitution of 1959; amended on 12
July 1988.
Legislature: National Assembly of 141 members elected for a
five year term by universal suffrage. Every citizen
who has had Tunisian nationality for at least five
years and who has attained 20 years of age has the
right to vote. Parties must be officially recognized
before they can contest elections.The National
Assembly shall hold two sessions every year, each
session lastingnot more than three months.
Additional meetings may be held at the demand of
the President or of a majorityof the deputies.
Last election: April 2, 1989
Next election: 1994
Head of state: President, elected by universal sufferage for a
maximum of three five year terms. Is both Head of
State and Head of the Executive. Must not be less
than 40 years of age/not more than 70. Also the
Commander-in-Chief of the military and makes both
civil and military appointments. If the presidency
falls vacant for any reason before the end of a
president's term of office, the President of the
National Assembly shall take charge of affairs of the
state for a period of 45 to 60 days. At the end of
this period, a presidential election shall be held. The
President of the National Assembly is not eligible to
be a presidential candidate.
Executive: Council of Ministers presided over by head of state
who is also head of executive. Should the council of
ministers not receive the support of the National
Assembly it may be dissolved by the president and
elections for a new assembly held. If censured by
new Assembly, the Government must resign.
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APPENDIX B - POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN TUNISIA
RCD (Constitutional Democratic Rally), founded 1934 as the
Neo-Destour Party, following a split in the Destour (Constitution)
Party; Neo-Destour Party achieved Tunisian independence from
France in 1956; renamed Parti Socialiste Destourien in 1964 (PSD);
adopted present name in February 1988.
MDS (Democratic Socialist Movement), in favor of a pluralist
political system; participated in 1981 election and was officially
recognized in November 1983, Secretary General Muhammad Moaada.
MUP (Popular Unity Movement), supports radical reform; split
into two factions, one led by Ahmad Ben Salah, living in exile until
1988, the other became the PUP (see below).
PUP (Popular Unity Party), leader Muhammad Bel Hadj Amor.
PCT (Tunisian Communist Party), founded 1939, suspended
1963-81, Secretary General Muhammad Harmel.
Hizb al-Nahdah (Renaissance Party), formerly Movement of the
Islamic Way (MTI), banned in 1981, candidates stood in the 1989
elections as independents, leader Rachid Gannouchi, in exile, current
leader, Ali Laaridh, former Secretary General Abd al-Fatha Mourou
has split from party and is reportedly attempting to establish a
more moderate party .
RSP (Rassemblement Socialist Progressiste), founded in 1983;
officially recognized 1988; leftist; Secretary General Nejib Cheebi.
UDU (Union Democratique Unioniste), officially recognized
1988, supports Arab unity, Secretary General Abderrahmane Tlill.
(Sources for Appendixes A and B: The Economist Intelligence Unit,
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